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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
BILLS AND NOTES-DISHONOR BY NO?-<PAY!lrnNT-MARGINAL MEMORANDA 
FOR PARTIAL PAYMENTS.-Suit by the holder on the following note: 
"$100.00. Hampden, N. D., Sept. 2, I909. 
"On or before Sept. 2, 19ro, after date, I promise to pay to the 
order of the Sageng Threshing Machine Company, of Minneapolis, 
Minn., one hundred dollars. 
"Value received, with interest at 6 per cent. 
"$25 will be paid Nov. Ist, I909· 
"$25 will be paid Jan. 1st, 1910." 
"(Signed) ALBERT BENSON. 
On the back was the indorsement: "April I5, I9l0. Pd. $30" The plaintiff 
purchased the note in June, I9l0. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to offer 
evidence that he was a holder in due course, and that the fact that the pay-
ments referred to in the marginal notations had not been made in full did 
not make the plaintiff a purchaser of overdue paper. Robinson and Grace, 
JJ., dissenting. Union State Ba11k of Jfi1meapolis v. Benson (N. Dak., I9I7), 
I65 N. W. 509. 
It is to be observed that the prevailing opinion in the instant case does 
not expressly hold that the marginal memoranda are not part of the instru-
ment. Instead, the court argues that the memoranda are not sufficiently 
positive in terms to show an intention by the parties to allow the payee or 
holder to compel payment of the instalments at the times indicated. In other 
words, the notations are deemed merely to indicate a likelihood that the pay-
ments will be made at a certain time. Nevertheless, in view of the direct 
statement in the notations that "$25 will be paid November Ist, I909," and 
that "$25 will be paid Jan. 1st, 1910," the decision amounts to a holding that 
such notations are not a part of the instrument to the extent of controlling 
or affecting provisions expressed in the body thereof. The rule is well set-
tled that an agreement or memorandum placed on the back of a note before 
signing or at the time of delivery is to be considered a part of the note, 
even though the effect may be to destroy its negotiability. Kitrth v. Farmers' 
& Merchants' State Bank (Kan. 1908), 94 Pac. 798; Bay v. Shrader, 50 Miss. 
326; Kalamazoo National Bank v. Clark, 52 Mo. App. 593; Herrick v. Ed-
wards, 106 Mo. App. 633 ; Swaisland v. Davidson, 3 Ont. Rep. 320; Heaton 
v. Ainley, 108 Ia. II2; Grimison v. Russell, 14 Neb. 52I. Some courts have 
applied the same rule where the memorandum was unsigned. Seymo~tr v. 
Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292; Rlake v. Coleman, 22 Wis. 415. And it has been held 
that a stipulation printed across the margin of the body of the note that the 
note is to be discounted if paid before maturity is effective as a part of the 
instrument. National Bank of Commerce v. Feeney, 12 S. Dak. 156. The au-
thorities hold quite generally that marginal figures in the corner of a note are 
not a part thereof. Washington County State Bank v. Central Bank & Tmst 
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Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 168 S. W. 456; Bell v. Bir111illgha11i tAla. App.), 62 So. 
971; Williamson v. Smith, l Cold. (Tenn.) I, 78 Am. Dec. 478; Poorman v . 
.Mills, 39 Cal. 345. It should be noted, however, that in none of the cases here 
cited, nor in any other which the writer has found, was the sweeping state-
ment of the doctrine as to marginal figures at all necessary to the decision, 
since in each case the only point actually to be decided was that the marginal 
figures are controlled by the written words in the body of the instrument. 
Furthermore, the reason supporting the doctrine that marginal figures form 
no part of the instrument is not clear, in view of the extensive use of such 
figures, and especially in view of the provision in section 17 of the Negotia-
ble Instruments Law permitting a reference to the figures in case of ambigu-
ity or uncertainty. With reference to marginal memoranda below the signa-
tures there is a sharp conflict of authority. In support of the view that such 
memoranda constitute a part of the note, see Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 
396 (with an especially good discussion by Mr. Justice Allen); Van Zandt v. 
Hopkiiis, 151 Ill. 248; Black v. Epstein, 93 Mo. App. 459; Natio11al Bank of 
Commerce v. Feeney, supra; Specht v. Beindorf, 56 Neb. 553 (though it is 
not clear in this case whether the provision was written into the note above 
or below the signature). In support of the apparent holding of the instant 
case that such memoranda do not constitute a part of the note, see· Fisk v. 
McNeal, 23 Neb. 726; Danforth v. Stermaii (Ia.), 145 N. 'vV. 485; Becker v. 
Hofsom111er, 186 Ill. App. 553. On the whole, it would seem that the cases 
taking the latter view are forced to indulge in technical distinctions that lead 
to confusion without offering a better method of getting at the real inten-
tion of the parties. If memoranda on the back of the note at the time of 
execution are to be considered a part of it, it is hard to see why the same 
interpretation should not apply to memoranda on the face of the instrument. 
Co?.rn:imcE-FEDERAI. EMPI.OYERS' L1ABII.I'tY Acr-PERSONS SuBJEC't-"lN-
'tERS'tA'tE CoMMERcE".-Plaintiff was employed by an interurban electric rail-
way, operated wholly within the state, which received freight shipped 
to and from other states and transported it under through bills of lading. 
He was a member of a crew engaged in bonding, or cleaning the ends of 
the rails and connecting them by wiring, and was injured in boarding a car 
on which the crew rode. Held, that he was engaged in "interstate com-
merce" within the EMPI.OYimS' LlABJI.I'tY AC't, April 22, lgo8, c. 149, 35 Stat. 
65, (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, secs. 8657-8665). Cholerton v. Detroit, J. & C. 
Ry. (Mich., 1917), 165 N. W. 6o6. 
There is great conflict and contradiction among the authorities upon the 
question of when an employee of a common carrier is or is not working 
under the provisions of the federal act above referred to. It has frequently 
been held that, a carrier which is a link in a through line of road by which 
freight is carried into other states is engaged in the business of "interstate 
commerce," though its lines may be wholly within one state. Jn re Charge 
to Gmnd J11r)', 62 Fed. 828; U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305; Hous-
ton Direct Na1Jigatiou Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 8g Tex. l; Norfolk 
& W. R. R. Co. v. Co111111011wcalth, n4 Pa. 256. It has also been held that 
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the work of keeping the instrumentalities used by the carrier in the conduct 
of interstate commerce (its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, roadbed, 
track, and other equipment,) in a proper state of repair, while thus used, 
is so closely related to such commerce as to be in practice and in legal con-
templation a part of it; that, whatever work is a part of the interstate com-
merce in which the carrier is engaged is interstate commerce under the stat-
ute, and the work of repairing and maintaining the instrumentalities engaged 
in interstate commerce is such work; that the fact that the instrumentality 
may be used in both interstate and intrastate commerce does not prevent the 
employment of those engaged in its repair, or in keeping it in suitable con-
dition for use, from being an employment in interstate commerce. Pedersen 
v. Del. etc. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146; Zikos v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 179 Fed. 
8g3; Eng, v. So. Pac. Co., 210 Fed. 92; Montgomery v. So. Pac. Co., 64 Or. 
597; Holmberg v. Lake Shore, etc. R}1• Co., 188 Mich. 6o5. It was on the 
basis of"such reasoning as the above that the court in the instant case came 
to the conclusion that, being an adjunct to interstate commerce, a means ef-
fectuating the passage thereof, the plaintiff was engaged in "interstate com-
merce" within the meaning of the EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT. See extended 
notes in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 52, et seq. and L. R. A. 1915 C, 6o, et seq. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-"BoNE DRv'' ACT.-Plaintiff was arrested and held 
in custody solely because charged with having in his possession a bottle of 
whiskey, for his own use and benefit, within a prohibition district in the 
state of Idaho, in violation of an Idaho statute (Session Laws of Idaho, 
1915, ch. II), providing that no person shall have in his possession in a pro-
hibition district intoxicating liquors or alcohol, except for sacramental, scien-
tific, or mechanical purposes, or for compounding or preparing medicine. 
Plaintiff sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which was quashed in the State 
Supreme Court. Plaintiff then brought this appeal. Held, that the judg-
ment of the court below should be affirmed. Crane v. Campbell, 38 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 98. 
It was contended by the plaintiff in the instant case that the Idaho statute, 
in so far as it undertook to render criminal the mere possession of whiskey 
for personal use, conflicted with the "privileges and immunities" and "due 
process of law" clauses of the 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 
The court held that, since it had been decided that a State has the power 
absolutely to prohibit the manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or transporta-
tion of intoxicating liquors within its borders, and the power to adopt the 
measures reasonably appropriate or needful to render the exercise of that 
power effectiv, it could not be said that, considering the notorious difficulties 
always attendant upon efforts to suppress the liquor traffic, the inhibition 
of the possession of liquor was so arbitrary and unreasonable, or so with-
out proper relation to the legitimate legislative purpose, as to be an improper 
exercise of the police power of the state. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; 
Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Crowley v. 
Christensen, .137 U. S_. 86; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425; New York e~ rel. 
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Silz v. Hesterberg, 2II U. S. 3I; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623. The 
step taken by the court in its decision in the instant case was to be antici-
pated, in view of the recent decisions interpreting the WEBB~K:!;NYON ACT. 
ESPIONAGE Acr-PosT 0FFic1"--NoN-MAn.ABI.E MATTER-SEDITious Pun-
r.1CAT10Ns.-On an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a temporary 
injunction commanding the defendant, postmaster of the city of New York, 
to transmit the plaintiff's publication, "The Masses", through the mails, 
held, that it could not be said that the defendant was not warranted in ex-
cluding the journal under the authority of the ESPIONAGE Acr OF JUNE 15, 
l9I7. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (Cir. Ct. App., Nov. 2, 19I7). 
This decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals has the effect of reversing 
the decision of the District Court, granting a preliminary injunction, 16 
MICH. L. Rr:v. I3I. The court in the instant case held the act to be constitu-
tional, a proper exercise of the police power of the government; that, by it, 
Congress authorized and directed the ·Postmaster General not to transmit 
certain matter by mail, and to determine whether a particular publication 
is non-mailable under the terms of the law, thus requiring him to use judg-
ment and discretion in so determining, and making his decision conclusive 
before the courts, save where there appears to be a clear abuse of discretion; 
and that no such abuse of discretion appeared in the instant case. The Cir-
cuit Court expressly repudiated the decision of the District Court, to the 
effect that any action other than a direct advocacy of resistance to the exist-
ing law is not a violation of the ESPIONAGE ACT, holding that "if the natural 
and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law, 
and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade resistance, it is imma-
terial that the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interests of the per-
sons addressed in resistance are not suggested". 
EVIDENCE- COMPETENCY oF WITNESSES - CRIMIN AI. TR!Ar.s IN FEDERAi. 
CoURTs.-Upon the trial of defendants in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York for conspiring to buy and receive 
certain checks and letters stolen from duly authorized depositories of United 
States mail matter, objection was made to the competency of a witness for 
the Government who had been jointly indicted with defendants. The ob-
jection was based on the ground that this witness had previously pleaded 
guilty to the crime of forgery in one of the New York state courts and had 
served a sentence therefor, and, by the common law as administered in New 
York at the time of the enactment of the Federal Judiciary Act, these facts 
would have rendered the witness incompetent. The objection was overruled 
and the witness allowed to testify. Held, this ruling was correct. Rosen et 
al. v. United States (1918), 38 Sup. Ct. I48. 
In United States v. Reid et al., 12 How. 361, a case which came up from 
a Federal court in Virginia and upon which appellants in the instant case 
rely, the defendant attempted to call as a witness one who had been jointly 
indicted with him for a murder committed on the high seas. The court, in 
rejecting the testimony, held that the rules of evidence in force in the re-
spective states when the United States Judiciary Act was passed were to gov-
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ern the procedure in criminal trials in those courts, and that by the laws in 
force in Virginia at that time co-defendants were not competent witnesses. 
Practically the same doctrine was applied in Logan v. United States, 144 
U. S. 263, in which case the court held that the laws of Texas in force when 
that state was admitted to the Union must determine the admissibility of 
evidence in ·criminal proceedings by the United States government within 
that jurisdiction. While some doubt was cast upon the authority of these 
cases by the decision in Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, the precise 
point was not involved. In the instant case, however, the same situation 
was presented to the court as appeared in the Reid Case. Guided by the 
modern conviction that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing 
the testimony of all persons of suitable understanding, leaving the credibility 
and weight of such testimony to the court or jury, than by excluding the 
witnesses as incompetent, Mr. Justice CLARKE felt justified in repudiating 
the docfrine of the Reid Case, and concluded "that the dead hand of the 
common law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to such cases as we 
have here." 
HABEAS CORPUS-CUSTODY OF CHILD-VlSl'l'ING.-By deed executed in ac-
cordance with the statute, a father transferred his parental authority and 
custody over his three-year-old daughter to her grand-aunt, who formally 
adopted her. Upon the death of the child's mother, her grandmother brought 
suit for the custody of this child and also for that of her sister and two 
brothers, making the father and grand-aunt defendants. The court decreed 
that the three-year-old child should be left in the care and custody of her 
adoptive parents but required them to allow the child to visit one day in 
each month in the home of her grandmother, to whom the control of the 
other children was awarded. The defendant appealed on the gruond that 
the court had no authority to require these visits. Held, the court had such 
authority. Kirby et 1tx. v. Morris (Tex., 1917), lg8 S. W. 995. 
Appellants did not question the power of the court to award the custody 
in toto of the child as its best interests dictated, but objected to the limita-
tion imposed upon their authority requiring visits to the child's grandmother. 
Similar limitations seem to be of rather common occurrence in divorce de-
crees, and, in fact, the court will rarely fail to order that the parents shall 
have access to their children at all reasonable times and places. CHURCH, 
HABEAS CoRPUS, 449; Wand v. Wand, 14 Cal. 513; Knoll v. Knoll, II4 La. 
703; People v. Winston, 65 App. Div. 231. Whether such provisions are made 
primarily with reference to the child's welfare, or in recognition of parental 
rights, may be an open question. The court in the instant case, basing their 
authority to issue this decree on the recognized power of courts to issue 
similar decrees in divorce proceedings, seem to assume that visiting is or-
dered in the interests of the children. A contrary conclusion is indicated by 
the case of In re S1tccession of Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, in which it was held 
that the court had no power to require a father to send his children to visit 
their grandmother, although it would seem to have been for their best in-
terests. 
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LANDI.ORD AND T1;NAN't-CROPPING CON'tRAC't-COMl'£NSA'tION. - Plaintiff 
and defendant entered into an oral contract by which the defendant was to 
furnish seed, machinery and land and plaintiff was to farm and irrigate the 
land and to receive one-half of all that was raised. · Defendant prevented 
full performance. Held, not a contract of employment but in the nature of 
a joint adventure, and plaintiff could not recover wages for the period of 
actual work. Pace v. Beckett (Col., 1917), l6g Pac. 142. 
The legal relation created by such a situation is a question on which the 
courts are not agreed. The decisions differ widely as to whether an agree-
ment to cultivate land for a share of the crop involves the application of 
the rules of master and servant, or whether it is to be regarded as a joint 
adventure in the nature of a partnership, or whether it operates as a lease 
of the premises concerned. One hired to work land and receive as compen-
sation part of the produce is a cropper, not a tenant; he has no interest in 
the land but receives his share as the price of his labor. Adams v. McKesson, 
53 Pa. St. 81. The same conclusion is reached in Warner v. Hoisington, 42 
Vt. 94. In James v. James, 151 \.Vis. 78, the court said that the agreement 
partakes of the nature of a joint adventure entitling the parties to a chance 
in the profits derivable therefrom. In Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co. v. Doke 
(Texas), 152 S. \V. n74, it was held, that the relation was that of land-
lord and tenant, the landlord's share is treated as rent and in the absence 
of a stipulation to the contrary, he has no title to the crop until after division. 
In Minneapolis Iron Store Co. v. Branum, 36 N. D. 355, it was held that 
such a contract creates the relation of landlord and tenant and not that of 
master and servant. This case overruled Angell v. Egger, 6 N. D. 391. In 
some cases as Steel v. Frick, 56 Pa. 172, the court lays hold of certain words, 
"to farm, let, etc.," as evidencing a lease. The test, however, is the inten-
tion of the parties, and the instrument is to be read as a whole. Strangeway 
v. Eiseiiman, 68 Minn. 395. 
01mC£Rs-REcoVI(RY oF SALARY BY De ]UR£ EMPLOY££.-Relator asked 
pay "for the time he was illegally laid off as a grain helper", after the only 
money appropriated for that office had already been paid bona fide to the 
de facto occupant during that time. Held, that relator could not recover his 
pay from the city. People ex rel. Sartison v. Schmidt (Ill. 1917), n7 N. E. 
1037. 
This is the first case in lllinois to decide definitely "t11at payment made in 
good faith to a de facto officer constitutes a bar against the city to a claim 
for the same salary made by the officer de jure". Bullis v. Chicago, 235 Ill. 
472; Kenyon v. Chicago, 135 Ill. App. 227. The prevailing view sanctions the 
decision and the reasoning by which it was obtained. Dolan v. Ma·yor, 68 
N. Y. 274; Wayne Co1111ty v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176. Contra, Rillk v. Phila-
delphia, 15 Wkly. Notes Cas. 345, affirmed 2 Atl. 505; Andrews v. Portland, 
79 Me. 484; Hogan v. Hamilton County, 132 Tenn. 554. See notes in 19 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 794; 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 475; 14 MICH. L. REV. 261, 6og .. 
"The interest of the community requires that public offices be filled and the 
duties of the officers be discharged, and, since in order to secure such serv-
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ice, the officer performing it must ordinarily be paid, payment in good faith 
to the officer discharging the duties of the office is justified." The grain 
helper in this case is assimilated to a public officer under good authority and 
the conclusion follows inevitably. Higgins v. Mayor, 13I N. Y. 128; O'Hara 
v City of New York, 28 Misc. Rep. 258, 46 App. Div. 518, 167 N. Y. 567; Van 
Valkenburgh v. Mayor, etc., 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 208; Martin v. City of 
New York, 176 N. Y. 371. The employment of this analogy, however, seems 
useless: by keeping the mere employee whose position does not rise to the 
dignity of an office distinct from the office holder the identical result will be 
reached, for a class that receives money without performing any service 
therefor is the exception, not the general rule. Instead of forcing the "mere 
employees" into the class of officers for the purpose of applying an exception 
to the common rule as to officers, it would seem simpler and much less dan-
gerous to recognize the differences between the two. The two classes have 
to be distingnished in other respects. A de jure officer may recover the 
compensation of the de facto officer, but the de jure employee may not. 
Jones v. D11sma1i, 246 Pa. 513; Kidder v. Wilson, 90 Ver. 147· A de fure 
officer is entitled to the full amount of his salary without any deduction for 
the amount he earned or might have earned while not discharging his offi-
cial duties. Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536; Andrews v. Portland, 
79 Me. 484. Where the position is not strictly an office, however, the rule 
is different. Sutliffe v. New York, 132 App. Div. (N. Y.) 831; CoNSTANTIN-
£AU, Punuc OFFICERS, Sec. 222. 
WlLLS-AnEMPTlON.-Testator having power to appoint £10,000 among 
his younger children, made his will when he had four such children, appoint-
ing it all to them equally; but whether he said £2,500 to each, or equally to 
the four, or merely in equal shares, does not appear from the report, it be-
ing reported differently in different parts of the statement. Later when he 
had five younger children he made an appointment by deed to one of his 
daughters on her marriage of £2,ooo "in full discharge" of her share. Held, 
that such appointment was an ademption only pro tanto, and that she was 
still entitled to £500 out of the residue of £8,ooo leaving only £7,500 for the 
other four younger children. Moore's Rents (Land Commission, 1917), 
[1917], I Ir. R 244, 51 Ir. Law Times 1o6. 
If the court held that a legacy for a certain amount could not be adeemed 
by payment of a smaller amount, clearly proved to have been intended by 
the testator at the time to be in full satisfaction, it is not supported by the 
decision in Pym v. Lockyer, 5 M. & Cr. 29, relied on, and is in conflict with 
the general doctrine that ademption is purely a matter of intention of the 
testator. Moreover, £2,ooo in cash may have been actually worth more than 
£2,500 at the death of the testator. 
